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Abstract
This paper provides new evidence on the magnitude of the elasticity of substitution
between labour and capital for the Uruguayan manufacturing sector. Labour demand is
derived using a right-to-manage model estimated for the period 1985-1997 using data for
six industries. The evidence found suggests that the elasticity is generally less than 1.
Differences by industry and in time are also found. The latter result may be linked both to
the integration process underwent by Uruguay in the nineties and to the changes in the
bargaining framework that took place in that same period. As a nested CES production
function is used to derive the labour demand, the partial elasticity of substitution between
production and non-production workers is also calculated, being its magnitude quite low.
Finally, the model was estimated using data from industrial surveys (gathered from firms)
and from household surveys. The comparison of results shows that when using industrial
surveys data the estimated elasticities are higher than when using household surveys data.
The result is probably related to the different coverage of both sources, as well as to the
different accuracy reached in measuring wages.
Resumen
Este artículo brinda nueva evidencia sobre el valor de la elasticidad de sustitución entre
capital y trabajo, para la industria manufacturera uruguaya. La función de demanda de
trabajo se deriva a partir de un modelo de negociación salarial de tipo right-to-manage,
estimado durante el período 1985-1997, usando datos de seis industrias manufactureras. La
evidencia sugiere que la elasticidad de sustitución es generalmente menor que 1. Se
encuentran diferencias por industria y en el tiempo. Este último resultado puede asociarse
tanto al proceso de integración del país, iniciado en los noventa, como al cambio en el
marco de negociación salarial que tuvo lugar en el mismo período. Dado que la demanda
derivada de trabajo se obtiene a partir de una función producción CES anidada, el modelo
también permite calcular la elasticidad parcial de sustitución entre obreros y empleados,
siendo su magnitud bastante baja. Finalmente, el modelo se estimó usando datos
provenientes de encuestas industriales (en las que se entrevista a los establecimientos) y
encuestas de hogares. La comparación de los resultados obtenidos muestra que las
elasticidades estimadas son más altas cuando se usa el primer tipo de encuestas. Esto es
probablemente explicable tanto por la diferente cobertura de ambas encuestas como por la
diferente precisión en la medición de los salarios.
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1. Introduction
In 1985, when democracy was reinstated in Uruguay after a 12 years military regime, the
institutional setting in which labour relations took place changed drastically. Unions were
reorganised and started bargaining wage increases together with employers associations.
The government participated in these negotiations until 1991. Further, public workers
regained the right not to be fired (except for certain causes specified by law), while the
Ministry of Labour was again the main authority solving possible conflicts between
employers and employees.  Previous work (Cassoni, 1999a; Cassoni, Allen and Labadie,
1999; 1996) has shown that all these changes did have an impact on the manufacturing
sector labour demand. Unions, among other factors, have pushed wages up. The evidence
on which is the suitable bargaining model, however, is mixed. The results obtained in
Cassoni et al. (1996) pointed at an efficiency contracts model, or at least at a model in
which employment would not be on the labour demand function of firms. However, the
analysis of all contracts signed since 1985 supports the idea that the employers have
retained their right to adjust employment given the wage bargained in the so called Wage
Councils, as they do not include any clauses relative to the level of employment or to firing
practices. Under these assumptions, the effects of the new setting would have been
reflected in a change in the underlying production function, lowering both the wage and the
output elasticities of labour demand (Cassoni, 1999a and Cassoni et al., 1999). This result
was obtained estimating a right-to-manage model for the period 1985-1997, and comparing
it with those of a competitive model estimated for 1975-1984. Although the direction of the
changes found in the relevant parameters are robust, their magnitude is quite small. A
possible explanation could be linked to the existence of simultaneity bias. A 3-equations
system derived from a CES production function was postulated, reflecting the demand for
capital services, production and non-production workers, but only the demand for
production workers was estimated
1.
A first aim of this paper is to estimate the elasticity of substitution and hence the wage
elasticity of labour demand, using data on production and non-production workers, so as to
obtain new evidence on the magnitude of this parameter. The model to be used follows that
specified in Cassoni (1999a), that is, a right-to-manage bargaining model, with a
technology defined by a CES production function. However, instead of assuming there are
three distinct factors of production, a nested CES will be used (Sato, 1967), in which two
inputs - capital and labour – are considered, but the latter is classified in two categories, and
aggregated according to a CES function itself. Further, the partial elasticity of substitution
among both types of labour will be also derived.
A second objective here pursued relates to the sensitivity of results to the information set
used. In Uruguay the only source of information on employment by economic sector with a
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quarterly or monthly frequency is the Household Survey. Hence, recent work in Uruguay
that has attempted to estimate the parameters of a production function has used this source
of information.  However, it is well known that income measures obtained from household
surveys are not the best approximations of wages. Further, being the individual the unit of
observation, employment levels calculated from household surveys are not equal to those
obtained from establishment surveys in Uruguay. The former would cover a greater number
of firms than the latter, in which only establishments with 5 or more workers are
interviewed. If small firms use technologies that imply a different elasticity of substitution,
then the estimated value of this parameter might be different depending on the source of
information used.
2. The model
Firms are assumed to use a CES technology with two inputs, capital and labour. Labour, in
turn, may be classified in two categories: according to the worker being directly involved in
production or not (production and non-production workers). Labour is hence not
homogenous. It is assumed that both types of workers are combined according to a CES
function, following Sato (1967):
Q
1/: = {[∀ Lnp
κ   + (1-∀ )Lp
κ ]
Λ /κ  +  ∃ K
Λ }
1/Λ (1)
where Q is value added; Lnp refers to non-production workers; Lp refers to production
workers; and K accounts for capital services. The parameter :  allows for increasing or
decreasing returns to scale (: >1;  : <1); while ∆  and Λ  determine the elasticities of
substitution between Lnp and Lp (Φ npp) and between labour and capital (Φ KL), according to
the following formulae:
Φ KL = 1/(1-Λ )
Φ npp  = Φ KL  + (Φ κ  - Φ KL) / sL
with  Φ κ  = 1/(1-κ ) and sL labour share in value added
The partial elasticity of substitution between the two types of workers - Φ κ   - reflects
substitution within the subprocess generating labour but it does not take into account
technical restrictions as summarised by the elasticity of substitution between subprocesses.
On the other hand, Φ npp does account for the latter effect. The nested (two-levels) CES
production function thus imposes the restriction that the elasticity of substitution between
capital and both categories of workers is the same but it allows for a different elasticity of
substitution between the two types of labour. Further, it is possible that production and non-
production workers are complementary factors depending on the value of Φ KL (Anderson
and Moroney, 1994).
If firms maximise profits, subject to given prices of inputs, the system of derived demands
for the three inputs is:4























Where pc/p, wnp/p y wp/p are the prices of capital services, non-production and production
workers, respectively, relative to the product price, p. The coefficients labelled ( 0, ( 3 and ( 7
are constants; and the other parameters are defined as:
( 1 = 1/(1-Λ ) ( 2 = (1-Λ /: )*1/(1-Λ ) ( 4 = 1/(1-∆ )
( 5 = (1-Λ /: )*1/(1-∆ ) ( 6 = (Λ -∆ )/[∆ *(1-∆ )]
An alternative way to specify the above model is to assume maximisation takes place over
the average wage (w) so as to determine the aggregate labour input (L) and capital services,
subject to the distinction among production and non-production workers in a second stage.
This would yield the following model:
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where ∃ 0  and ∃ 3 are constants; ∃ 1 = 1/(1-Λ ) ; and ∃ 2 = (1-Λ /: )*1/(1-Λ )
The parameter ∆ , needed to calculate the elasticity of substitution among both types of
workers, can be obtained by estimating the equation resulting from dividing equation (3) by
equation (4):
Lnp  / Lp = Ν 0(wnp/wp )
-(
4 (7)
Following Cassoni (1999a), wages are not exogenous but determined after a bargaining
between employers and unions takes place, taking into account that the employers retain
their right to manage. Assuming the utility function of unions is derived form a median
voter framework and that they maximise a surplus over an alternative income w
a, the
generalised Nash bargain can be stated as:
Max Υ  = (Γ -Γ 0)
β  (Π -Π 0)
1-β
     w
      s. t.
L = L*
 where Γ  and Π  are the utility functions of unions and employers, respectively:
Π (p, Q, K, L, pc, w) = pQ - wL - pcK5
Γ (w, w
a, L)  = (w- w
a)L
φ  
 Γ 0 and Π 0 are the fall-back positions of each player, which are assumed to be zero (Binmore,
Rubinstein and Wolinsky, 1986)
 2; L* is employment as determined in a second stage when
firms maximise profits subject to the negotiated wage level; ∃  is the bargaining power of
unions; and φ  is a parameter reflecting the weight given to employment in the union utility
function.
Subject to the assumption that the capital level is given, once bargaining over the wage and
labour demand occur, the solution to the Nash bargain yields an equation for the wage level as
follows:
w/p = 0 (S,O)*w
a/p    (8)
where 0  is the mark-up over w
a/p and depends on union density (S) and the degree of
competitiveness the firm is subject to (O), as proxies of the bargaining power of unions.
The model to be estimated would be the 4-equations system (5)-(8). However, as no data on
capital services is available, equation (5) will be omitted. The exclusion of one or more
equations would thus generate simultaneity biases in the estimates of the parameters. The
appropriate method of estimation is the Seemingly Unrelated Regressions method,
proposed by Zellner (1962).
3. Data
The units of observation are the 2-digit manufacturing industries. Only six out of eight are
used, due to data availability in the period 1985-1997: food, beverage and tobacco; textiles
and apparel; paper; chemicals and oil products; non-metallic minerals; and metallic
products.
The first model estimated uses data on output, number of workers and wages that stem from
the Quarterly and Annual Industrial Surveys (National Institute of Statistics-INE). The
Quarterly Survey publishes indexes while yearly the Annual Survey reports values. Both
sources were used to build quarterly time series of values for the above variables. In the
second model, employment and wages are calculated using data from the Household
Survey (INE) on a quarterly basis, taking into account only formal workers. Formality is
defined in terms of the individual having the legally stipulated health care coverage (public
or private depending on the sector).
Information relative to non-production workers, as well as to wages of both types of
workers, is not published on a quarterly basis since 1992. In order to get quarterly data for
number of workers it is assumed that the 1991 seasonal pattern remains for the period
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1992-1997. Regarding wages, the within year evolution is assumed to be identical to that
reported by the Wage Survey, that is also carried out by the INE.
Apart from having a different unit of observation (the establishment and the worker), the
Industrial Survey gathers information relative only to firms with 5 or more workers.
Further, declared earnings are known to be less accurate when obtained from individuals
than from firms. Those differences have to be taken into account when comparing the
estimated elasticities of substitution using both sources.
The cost of labour is built adding to the wage variable all costs related to social security;
taxes; annual premia and other bargained costs, as described in Cassoni (1999a).
The degree of openness is used as a proxy to the competitiveness of the industry. It is
calculated as the ratio of exports plus imports (as reported by the Republic Bank of
Uruguay and the Customs Office) to value added.
Union density is defined as the affiliation rate, by industry. The time series is built using
data on membership reported by the central union (PIT-CNT) in each congress and of total
employment. These congresses took place in 1985, 1987, 1990, 1993 and 1997.
Figure 1 depicts the evolution of the main variables for the whole manufacturing sector.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for each industry and for the whole manufacturing
sector.
Union density declined all along the period, with the strongest decline registered after 1993.
Simultaneously, the degree of openness of the economy has steadily increased, being the
consolidation of the integration process a further accelerator of the process. The path of the
manufacturing product reveals there is a period of stagnation between 1989 and 1994. The
level of employment has declined continuously since 1989, although the speed with which
this is recorded by the Industrial Survey is faster than that stemming from the Household
Survey data. This might reflect the fact that bigger firms adjusted the level of employment
more than smaller ones. Wages have increased in the period, although at a lower pace after
1993, specially according to the Household Survey data. This date could be related to the
new setting for bargaining operating since 1991 and with all contracts that had been signed
before, having expired. Finally, the ratio of non-production to production workers has
increased in the sub-period 1992-1996, being this pattern matched by a decrease in relative
wages. On average, relative employment is equal to 0.3, but it differs greatly among
industries. While only 65% of workers are directly involved in the production process in
chemicals and oil products, 85% of employees in textiles are production workers.
Regarding the relative wage, there are also differences among industries, but not as sharp as
in the composition of employment. On average, non-production workers are paid twice the
wage of production workers.7
Figure 1: Evolution of main variables – Manufacturing sector 1985-1997
Note: L is employment in logs; RW is real labour cost in logs; Q is value added in logs; LNPP is the ratio of non-
production to production workers; RWNPP is the ratio of non-production to production workers real wage; UNION is the
affiliation rate; OPEN is the degree of openness. IS and HS mean the data stem from the Industrial Survey and the
Household Survey, respectively.
Sources: Quarterly and Annual Industrial Surveys (INE); Household Survey (INE); Republic Bank of Uruguay (BROU);
Central Bank of Uruguay (BCU); Customs Office; National Accounts (BCU); different newspapers for union























































Table 1: Descriptive Statistics   -    Manufacturing Industries 1985-1997
Employment
Mean
          I31         I32         I34         I35         I36         I38     Total
IS     45615        35702        9066       15483        6614       16662    135970
HS     53437        43467        9487       17981        6535       18470    158200
Standard Deviation
          I31         I32         I34         I35         I36         I38     Total
IS       5529        9360        1261        2875         867        3321     24197
HS       4134        9483        1321        2663        1321        2433     15683
Real labour cost
Mean
         I31         I32         I34         I35         I36         I38      Total
IS       158         163         201         345         141         166       184
HS       140         138         141         275         118         152       146
Standard Deviation
          I31         I32         I34         I35         I36         I38     Total
IS      37.64       48.56       67.01      168.56       36.55       44.87     52.39
HS      31.34       48.37       41.13      144.01       41.35       49.33     43.53
Other variables
Mean
          I31         I32         I34         I35         I36         I38     Total
LNPP     0.32        0.18        0.47        0.51        0.26        0.32      0.30
RWNPP    2.04        2.33        1.73        2.32        2.17        1.89      2.08
Q       20.34       10.59        3.26       15.71        2.35        6.57     60.17
UNION   47.34       43.35       48.17       98.95       18.34       48.12     36.50
OPEN    24.76       60.87       22.69       51.18       22.80      162.51     46.77
RAW     77.08       85.76       95.88      115.56       77.50       89.41     52.43
Standard Deviation
           I31         I32         I34         I35         I36         I38     Total
LNPP       0.03       0.02        0.04        0.05        0.03        0.03      0.02
RWNPP      0.16       0.24        0.24        0.26        0.29        0.35      0.34
Q          2.29       1.66        0.33        2.98        0.36        1.75      5.10
UNION     10.95      17.38        9.47        9.93       12.46       26.04     12.92
OPEN       3.55      11.59       10.35       25.40        8.90      102.61     10.93
RAW       12.98      23.20       25.23       43.58       16.87       23.11     14.75
Note: Employment refers to total number of workers; Real labour costs per worker are monthly pesos of 1988;
LNPP is the ratio of non-production to production workers; RWNPP is the relative wage of non-production and
production workers; Q is monthly value added in 1988 million pesos; UNION is the affiliation rate; OPEN is the
degree of openness; and RAW is the monthly alternative real wage in pesos of 1988. IS means data come from the
Industrial Survey while HS refers to information stemming from the Household Survey.
Sources: Quarterly and Annual Industrial Surveys (INE); Household Survey (INE); Republic Bank of Uruguay
(BROU) ; Central Bank of Uruguay (BCU); Customs Office; National Accounts (BCU); different newspapers for
union membership, as reported by the Central Union (PIT-CNT).
Finally, the comparison of the data relative to employment and wages using the Industrial
and the Household Surveys shows that employment is generally higher and wages are
lower when stemming from the latter source. This could be linked to the omission of the
smallest establishments in the Industrial Survey, as already mentioned, and to the fact that
in those firms workers are paid less than in bigger establishments.9
4. Results
The model to be estimated is the system (6)-(8) that is reproduced in logs here below:
lnL  =  ∃ 0 + ∃ 1ln(w/p) + ∃ 2lnQ  
ln(Lnp /Lp) = Ν 0 + Ν 1 ln(wnp/wp )
ln(w/p) = 0 0 + 0 1S + 0 2O+ 0 3ln(w
a/p)
The analysis of the order of integration of the series involved results in all being either
integrated of order one or stationary
3. The non-stationarity of the ratio of production to non-
production workers would imply that exogenous shocks that have led to a re-structuring of
the manufacturing sector have had a permanent effect on the mix of employment in most
industries. A possible explanation could be related to the need of firms to reduce their
labour force, partly due to the increase in non-wage costs. This has resulted in many firms
promoting that some of their production workers –those linked to a specific part of the
production process- create an independent firm that sells its services to the original one.
Another fact worth considering is that increased competitiveness has also forced firms to
emphasise processes related to quality control, commercialisation practices and strategies
aiming to get new customers. Further, a possible effect of unionisation is a reduction in
wage differentials and this might also have had a permanent effect in the wage structure.
Co-integration tests, following Engle and Granger (1987) procedure, do not reject the
existence of an equilibrium relationship between labour, wages and output, if labour costs
are instrumented using the alternative wage, openness and union density as instruments.
Relative employment and relative wages are also found to be co-integrated.
Given these results, the associated dynamic form is specified as a distributed lag model,
starting with four lags of every variable. Output is instrumented using its own lags to avoid
endogeneity biases. Fixed effects are allowed for to account for specific characteristics of
the different industries.
In Cassoni (1999a) evidence was found suggesting both the labour demand function and the
wage equation shifted at some point at the beginning of the nineties. This was linked to the
change in the structure of bargaining that took place in 1991. The data pointed at 1993 as
the time period in which the shift would have occurred. Hence, dummy variables for the
post-1993 period are included here also, in all equations, and their significance tested for.
Finally, using a pooled cross section – time series dataset could result in some or all
parameters being different by industry. Hence, the stability in the cross section of every
coefficient was also analysed.
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Thus, the econometric strategy followed was one of specifying very general models that
were sequentially reduced. The starting and final forms of these models are reported in the
appendix. The final dynamic form of the equations never includes more than two lags.
There is evidence supporting that some parameters are unstable in the nineties, while
differences by industry cannot always be rejected. Moreover, in some cases a combination
of both effects is also supported by the data. Regarding the wage and employment
equations, the existence of so many sources of variation makes it difficult to arrive at a
unique model, as some of these effects cannot be properly differentiated. Misspecification
tests were performed to all equation individually and to the system. Normality is generally
rejected, but given the sample size, the results of hypothesis tests should be still robust
(Spanos, 1986). As heteroskedasticity is also found, reported standard errors are corrected
following White (1980). Autocorrelation is always rejected.
4.1 Results using industrial surveys data
The final form of the equation describing the relative demand of blue and white-collar
workers allows for one lag in the dependent variable and none in the relative wage. There
are differences by industry in the speed of adjustment to equilibrium, as indicated by the
coefficient of lagged relative labour demand (see Table 2). Thus, it could be argued that the
long run partial elasticity of substitution between production and non-production workers
(1/(1-ρ )=Φ κ ) is greater in paper; chemicals and oil products; and non-metallic minerals than
in food, beverage and tobacco; textiles; and metallic products, the estimated values being
0.5 and 0.2, respectively. Although these figures seem a bit low, estimates for developed
countries are between 0 and 3.7, with a mean value of 1 (Wood, 1994, pp132).
Finally, there is also evidence suggesting the curve shifted out in the nineties, so that the
same relative wage would yield a higher ratio of non-production to production workers
after 1993 (between 7% and 14%, depending on the industry, in the long run). The result
could be linked to the processes already described by which firms have increased the
number of white-collar workers and reduced that of blue-collars.
The final form of the wage equation includes two lags of the wage and one of the
alternative income (Table 3). The long run estimator of the coefficient multiplying the
alternative wage is statistically equal to one. On the other hand, the effect of openness on
the mark-up is statistically zero when including these lags. In spite of this, the value of the
coefficient in the long run is of the same order than when estimating the model with no lags
of the alternative wage and one lag of the real wage, in which case the estimator is
significant
4. Although the fact that increased openness would set a bound to the wage
inflation is very appealing, the order of the effect is very small, as doubling the degree of
openness would only generate a 2.5% reduction in the real wage, in the long run.
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    Table 2
Dependent variable: LNPP
Nº Obs: 300















Note: LNPP is the relative employment of non-production to
production workers. qr1, qr2 and qr3 denote dummy
variables for quarters 1 to 3, respectively. I31 to I36 are
dummy variables related to the industry (31 is food, beverage
and tobacco; 32 is textiles; 34 is paper; 35 is chemicals and
oil products; 36 is non-metallic minerals). Dummy93 is
equal to 1 after 1992. RWNPP is the relative cost of non-
production to production labour. LNPP_1 is LNPP lagged
one quarter. LNPP31_1 to LNPP36_1 are LNPP_1
multiplied by I31 to I36.
Regarding the effect of union density on the mark-up, it is not possible to arrive at a unique
specification. Some of the tests performed to analyse temporal stability point at a change in
the nineties, lowering the effect of unions on the mark-up over the alternative wage.
However, the result is quite sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of other variables, as
well as to the combination of changes in the parameters in time and among industries (see
the appendix). Thus, the final specification chosen was a simple one, in which the
parameter multiplying union density is imposed to be the same for all industries and stable
in time (column (1) of Table 3). Its estimated effect is such that a 10% increase in the
affiliation rate - calculated at its mean value – would imply a 1% increase in the real wage.
All these three effects are consistent with the ones obtained in previous work using data
only on production workers. The result can be read as supporting the hypothesis that trade
unions bargain disregarding the specific occupation of their members at the firm. However,
in 1993 the wage equation would have shifted, so that for equal values of the alternative
income, union density and openness, real wages would be 11% higher than before (in the
long run). This last finding might be linked to the change in the composition of labour,
increasing the relative share of non-production workers, whose wage is twice that of12
production workers. This, in turn is consistent with some recent evidence on increased
wage dispersion and increased returns to schooling since 1992 (Gradín and Rossi, 1999;
Miles and Rossi, 1999).
Table 3
Dependent variable: RW
Nº obs: 300                                              (1)          (2)
Variable   Coefficient    Std.Error    Coefficient    Std.Error
Constant -0,02190 0,06924 0,12953 0,10000
qr1 0,01337 0,00714 -0,02360 0,00846
qr2 -0,02726 0,00567 0,00553 0,00699
qr3 -0,00615 0,00485 -0,00299 0,00682
I31 0,01614 0,01254 0,01750 0,01534
I32 0,00285 0,01015 0,00111 0,01363
I34 0,01017 0,01318 0,00892 0,01707
I35 0,05638 0,01776 0,14400 0,02289
I36 0,00253 0,01439 -0,01131 0,02209
DUMMY93 0,01908 0,00916 0,10680 0,02709
UNION 0,03918 0,01886 0,09912 0,02842
OPEN -0,00725 0,00580 -0,02107 0,00946
RAW 1,03670 0,04738 0,61091 0,04566
RAW_1 -0,81793 0,05864         ------         ------
RW_1 0,70344 0,04291 0,46418 0,03683
RW_2 0,11746 0,02899         ------         ------
UNION9331         ------         ------ -0,11120 0,06446
UNION9332         ------         ------ -0,29380 0,06891
UNION9334         ------         ------ -0,09316 0,06052
UNION9335         ------         ------ -0,00110 0,02729
UNION9336         ------         ------ -0,57148 0,27853
UNION9338         ------         ------ -0,24002 0,05490
Note: RW is the real cost of labour. qr1, qr2 and qr3 denote dummy variables for quarters 1 to 3,
respectively.  I31 to I36 are dummy variables related to the industry (31 is food, beverage and tobacco;
32 is textiles; 34 is paper; 35 is chemicals and oil products; 36 is non-metallic minerals; 38 is metallic
products). DUMMY93 is equal to 1 after 1992, 0 elsewhere. UNION is union density; OPEN is degree of
openness; RAW is the alternative wage. Variables ending in “_1” indicate that the original variable is
lagged one period. UNION9331 to UNION9338 refer to UNION multiplied by DUMMY93 and by I31
to I38, respectively.
Finally, three specifications are reported for the labour demand equation. As in the wage
equation, temporal and cross-section instability was supported by the data, but the results
are too sensitive to the inclusion and exclusion of variables.
The final models reported reflect quite different situations. In column (1) of Table 4 the
elasticity of substitution between labour and capital is allowed to vary per industry as well
as in time. Before 1993, the value of the parameter would have ranged from 0 (reflecting a13
Leontieff technology) to 0.74, which is not a surprising result, given the heterogeneous
nature of the activities involved. After that date, all industries would have changed
technology, towards one with a greater elasticity of substitution (that is equal to 1 in four of
them). However, the temporal change would have been accompanied by an outward shift of




Nº obs: 300                                         (1)  (2) (3)
Variable   Coefficient           Std.Error   Coefficient          Std.Error   Coefficient        Std.Error
Constant 2,13600 0,35229 1,78210 0,26808 1,31480 0,23009
qr1 0,01938 0,00959 0,01014 0,00940 0,01118 0,00917
qr2 0,00163 0,00493 0,00200 0,00490 0,00204 0,00479
qr3 -0,01734 0,00489 -0,01775 0,00518 -0,01758 0,00509
I31 -0,00397 0,34562 -0,03881 0,13267 0,03953 0,03465
I32 -0,53530 0,31817 0,31006 0,14319 0,04843 0,01981
I34 -0,49697 0,30885 -0,21929 0,14670 -0,01999 0,02409
I35 -0,16632 0,29856 0,05784 0,13280 0,24065 0,05747
I36 -1,03910 0,28626 -0,27761 0,16921 -0,04694 0,03451
DUMMY93 0,60606 0,24197 -0,02968 0,01184 -0,03022 0,00974
PROD 0,22385 0,06778 0,11825 0,04510 0,12424 0,03637
PROD_1 -0,09565 0,04541 -0,05417 0,02461 -0,05180 0,02380
PROD35 -0,16456 0,02231 -0,09296 0,04067 -0,10470 0,02240
RW -0,15281 0,05916 -0,07928 0,03259 -0,04680 0,01461
RW31 0,01288 0,07141 0,02306 0,02843
RW32 0,13046 0,06543 -0,04656 0,02709
RW34 0,09589 0,06300 0,03447 0,02678
RW35 0,10643 0,05959 0,03080 0,02451







L_1 0,79557 0,03054 0,84670 0,02603 0,87618 0,02208
Note: : L is total employment. qr1, qr2 and qr3 denote dummy variables for quarters 1 to 3, respectively.  I31 to I36 are dummy variables related to the
industry (31 is food, beverage and tobacco; 32 is textiles; 34 is paper; 35 is chemicals and oil products; 36 is non-metallic minerals; 38 is metallic
products). Dummy93 is equal to 1 after 1992., 0 elsewhere; PROD is production; PROD35 is PROD by I35. RW is the real cost of labour. RW31 to
RW36 are RW by I31 to I36. RW93 is RW by DUMMY93. RW3193 to RW36 are RW93 multiplied by I31 to I36.
The second model, summarised in column (2) of the same table, thus allows for a different
elasticity of substitution by industry but that is stable in time. However, only that of textiles
is statistically different from the rest (the elasticity of substitution would be equal to 0.42
for all industries, while that of textiles would be 0.77 and statistically equal to 1).14
The last model imposes a common elasticity of substitution for all industries and that does
not vary in time
5. Its estimated long run value is 0.36, quite similar to that obtained using
the previous model, although in the short run it is smaller than that resulting from model 2
(0.048 versus 0,067 for all industries except textiles). In Figure 2 a simulation is done in
order to show the modelled change in the labour demand function in 1993. It is there
assumed that all industries have the same initial wage level and that production is constant.
The values used for the wage (in logs) are not the actual ones but just a simulated series.
The picture that emerges from the graphs is that, if the models were correctly predicting
labour demand, then at least at high wage levels employment would be lower today than
before 1993, in all industries.
Figure 2
The above results suggest that, although it is not possible to obtain a robust specification,
differences by industry and in time do exist and their omission might be biasing the results
obtained when imposing common coefficients. An alternative strategy would have been to
estimate a multivariate model in which the labour demand of each industry was estimated
separately. However, and probably due to the level of aggregation of the data, this
                                                          
5 When a common parameter for all industries is imposed, temporal instability is rejected.





02 0 4 0 6 0 L 1985-92 L 1993-97







02 0 4 0 6 0 L 1985-92 L 1993-97






0 5 10 15 20 L 1985-92 L 1993-9715
methodology proved to be ineffective. Thus, future work should be directed to obtain data
at the level of the firm.
Considering all the evidence found, it could be argued that the elasticity of substitution
between capital and labour in the manufacturing industries should range between 0.3 and 1.
There is also some evidence suggesting an increase of the parameter in the nineties, but this
result is not robust enough at this stage. In Cassoni (1999a) an elasticity equal to 1 was
found before 1985. So a first question would be: is it sensible that firms could have
changed technology twice in 23 years, towards one with less/more possibilities of
substitution between the two main production factors when relative prices change? An
affirmative answer can be proposed if one looks at the economic and institutional
environment in which manufacturing firms operated along the period. First, in 1985-1992
unions were not only active but very influential. Membership was at its top and bargaining
was very synchronised and co-ordinated. On the other hand, in the pre-1985 period unions
were illegal while after 1992 they started losing members and bargaining power,
negotiations at the firm level started to generalise and contracts were no more enforceable.
One could think then that during 1985-1992 the institutional framework could have
promoted technologies in which substitution between labour and capital was more difficult
than in others, due to the explicit and/or implicit pressure of strong unions. Together with
this institutional setting, the economic policies instrumented in the sub-periods have
promoted or discouraged investment. In the mid-seventies the first steps towards
liberalisation were taken. This, together with the exchange rate policy (pre-announced
exchange rate and overvalued local currency) did impulse firms to invest in new
technology. However, with the 100% devaluation of the peso at the end of 1982 and the
increase in interest rates, a lot of highly indebted firms were forced to close. On the other
hand, in the nineties, the consolidation of the integration process in the MERCOSUR, plus
a new exchange rate policy leading to an overvaluation of the local currency promoted
investment in new technology once again. Thus, the economic environment, with more
competitive pressure for firms and a relatively low exchange rate, could also have resulted
in firms using technologies with higher elasticities of substitution in the pre-1985 period
and in the nineties than those used in the 1985-1992 period.
In spite of the heterogeneity of the reported results, their comparison with those stemming
from other recent research for Uruguay shows they are quite sensible. Cassoni (1999a),
using quarterly data only on production workers for 2-digit manufacturing industries along
the same period, obtained an estimated value of 0.4, rejecting differences by industry and in
time. Cassoni (1999b), using the same dataset than in this paper and a model similar to that
in column (2), estimated an elasticity of substitution that is equal to 1 for textiles; non-
metallic minerals; and metallic products and around 0.5 for the other three industries. On
the other hand, Tansini and Triunfo (1998), used establishment data for a sub-sample of
manufacturing firms (those that have survived all along the period 1988-1994) and a
translog cost function. The reported elasticity of substitution is 1.78, but its standard
deviation is 1.2. Finally, regarding international studies on this topic, Wood (1994, pp 132-
133) argues that developed economies show an elasticity of substitution between 0.5 and
1.5 for the industrial sector while that for developing economies is between 0.5 and 1.2.16
Further, Hamermesh (1993, pp 92) argues that given the empirical work surveyed in the
book, a simple mean of the elasticity of substitution would be 0.75.
The calculated elasticities of substitution between capital and labour imply that the wage
elasticity of labour demand would be, on average, –0.3, varying between –0.1 and –1
depending on the industry and the time period, increasing in all industries in since 1993
(see Table 5).
A last comment relates to the values of the elasticity of substitution between non-
production and production workers (Φ npp), given the estimated values for Φ KL and Φ κ , and
the share of labour costs in value added (sL). The latter varies from 18% to 55% depending
on the industry, being on average 30%. If the whole period is split in two, 1985-1992 and
1993-1997, these shares slightly increase in the latter, for all industries except chemicals
and oil products. Blue and white-collar workers are substitutes in paper; chemicals and oil
products; and non-metallic minerals when using models in columns (2) and (3) of Table 4.
If results in column (1) are used, they are substitutes also in textiles in the first subperiod.
However, after 1992, the elasticity of substitution significantly decreases in paper and in
non-metallic minerals, while production and non-production workers become complements
in textiles and in chemicals and oil products. This is the consequence of the increase in the
possibilities of substituting labour by capital (Table 5).
Table 5
σ KL η LL
      M1      M1        M2        M3        M1       M1          M2        M3
Industry 1985-92 1993-97 1985-92 1993-97
Food, bev. & tobacco 0,68 1,25 0,37 0,38 -0,56 -1,02 -0,30 -0,26
Textiles 0,11 0,76 0,82 0,38 -0,09 -0,57 -0,64 -0,26
Paper 0,28 0,84 0,29 0,38 -0,17 -0,49 -0,17 -0,26
Chemicals 0,23 0,74 0,32 0,38 -0,18 -0,57 -0,25 -0,26
Non-metallic min. 0,00 0,65 0,27 0,38 0,00 -0,32 -0,12 -0,26
Metallic prods. 0,75 1,29 0,52 0,38 -0,56 -0,89 -0,38 -0,26
         σ ρ       σ npp
      M1      M1       M2        M3
1985-92 1993-97
Food, bev. & tobacco 0,22 -1,90 -4,39 -0,42 -0,12
Textiles 0,22 0,65 -1,42 -1,83 -0,12
Paper 0,51 0,86 0,05 0,83 0,82
Chemicals 0,46 1,47 -0,49 1,02 0,64
Non-metallic min. 0,50 0,88 0,34 0,69 0,77
Metallic prods. 0,22 -1,32 -2,18 -0,55 -0,12
Note: M1 to M3 refer to models in columns (1) to (3) in Table 4. σ KL is the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital. σ ρ
is the partial elasticity of substitution between non-production and production workers. σ npp is the elasticity of  substitution between
production and non- production workers (σ KL + (σ ρ  -σ KL )/sL , with  sL thelabour share in value added).  η LL is the wage elasticity of
labour demand (-(1- sL)*σ KL)17
4.2 Results using household surveys data
The Household Survey does not differentiate between white and blue-collar workers.
Hence, the equation for relative employment cannot be estimated. Results for the wage and
labour demand equations are summarised in Table 6. The final specification reported is
slightly different from those reported in the previous sub-section. Regarding the dynamic
structure, more lags are needed in the labour demand equation. Regarding the stability of
parameters, no temporal instability is detected while no differences among industries are
supported by the data.
A second comment relates to the significance of the parameters in the wage equation. The
union variable, having the opposite sign to that expected, is not significant. Openness, on
the other hand, has the expected negative effect on wages, but its magnitude is twice that of
the previous model. How could one reconcile these findings with previous results? A first
hypothesis must be related to the coverage of the Household Survey. If these data refer to
all firms, the result poses a question on union coverage of individuals working at small
firms. If workers of small firms are not union  members and/or they have little or no access
to the channels leading to effective wage claims, then this sample would include a lot of
outsiders. Their wage might have gone down given the increase in unemployment resulting
from unions rising wages in the more organised strata.
Table 6
Dependent variable:    L
Nº obs: 300
Dependent variable:    RW
Nº obs: 300                             
Variable Coefficient    Std.Error Variable Coefficient    Std.Error
Constant 4,22730 0,63829    Constant -0,30895 0,15131
qr1 0,01335 0,02411    qr1 0,11764 0,01975
qr2 0,02342 0,02433    qr2 0,03351 0,02073
qr3 -0,00753 0,02257    qr3 -0,00294 0,01836
I31 0,30246 0,09588    I31 0,04063 0,02754
I32 0,27958 0,06758    I32 -0,04323 0,02385
I34 -0,20270 0,06402    I34 -0,11853 0,03419
I35 -0,10052 0,07465    I35 0,17619 0,04816
I36 -0,33776 0,09337    I36 -0,09531 0,04098
PROD 0,12574 0,06675    OPEN -0,02823 0,01608
RW -0,06382 0,02823    UNION -0,05466 0,06268
L_1 0,34172 0,07827    RAW 0,77151 0,07364
L_2 0,23593 0,07427    RW_1 0,21560 0,05758
   RW_2 0,19965 0,05047
Note: L is total employment; RW is the real cost of labour; qr1, qr2 and qr3 denote dummy
variables for quarters 1 to 3, respectively.  I31 to I36 are dummy variables related to the
industry (31 is food, beverage and tobacco; 32 is textiles; 34 is paper; 35 is chemicals and oil
products; 36 is non-metallic minerals; 38 is metallic products). PROD is production. “-1” and
“-2” besides a variable means the variable is lagged one and two periods, respectively.
Dummy93 is equal to 1 after 1992, 0 elsewhere. OPEN is the degree of openness. UNION is
the affiliation rate. RAW is the real alternative income.18
Elasticities resulting from the labour demand function are smaller than those calculated
using establishment data. The output-employment elasticity is 0.20 (vis  vis a value of
around 0.6, according to Table 4) while the capital-labour elasticity of substitution is 0.15
(vis   vis a value ranging from 0.4 to 1). In this case, it is sensible to think that
establishments using less than 5 workers have technologies in which substitution between
capital and labour is more difficult, given their relatively restricted access to capital
markets.  Thus, their inclusion in the sample would bias downwards the average elasticity.
Accordingly, the wage elasticity of labour demand is only –0.1 on average, and varying
very little among industries (between –0.07 and –0.12). Finally, the elasticity of substitution
between non-production and production workers indicates they are substitutable factors
(σ npp is between 0.4 and 1.7 depending on the industry), which is no surprise given the low
possibilities of substitution between labour and capital.
5. Conclusions
New evidence regarding the magnitude of the elasticity of substitution between capital and
labour in the Uruguayan manufacturing industry is here reported. Results point to this
parameter being less than or equal to 1. This result, in turn, is quite consistent with other
research performed for Uruguay. It also implies a quite low wage elasticity of labour
demand, although still within international ranges. Regarding the magnitude of the
elasticity of substitution among production and non-production workers, when keeping the
level of the labour input fixed, the evidence found points at a low value. Further, once
substitution with capital is allowed for, both categories of labour result in being
complements.
The analyses performed, however, also suggest that the elasticity of substitution between
capital and labour has changed in the nineties, increasing its value. Is this linked to the
integration process the economy is undergoing? Which is the role of the new bargaining
framework in this process? Is the death of small firms, possibly as a consequence of
increased competitiveness, in the root of the econometric result? The answers to these
questions need further research.
On the one side, decentralised  relative to sectoral bargaining would imply lower wage
inflation, as it was demonstrated in Calmfors and Driffill (1988), despite there are other
issues to be taken into account when an open economy such as the Uruguayan is analysed
(Rama, 1994; Forteza, 1998). Hence, one interesting line of future work should be one
developing a model that incorporates the new bargaining setting. Related to this, a gap to be
filled is that of a possible change in the objective function of trade unions, once
synchronisation and co-ordination are broken.
A completely different but nonetheless necessary research goal should be to develop a
model that explicitly considers the death and birth of firms, as a result of the re-structuring19
of the manufacturing sector. This should be accounted for by specifying an equation in
which the probability of surviving or dying is modelled.
On the other hand, the analysis done has shown that using data aggregated by industry
might be inconclusive, at least in the Uruguayan case. Shocks to the industrial sector, as
well as changes in the institutional setting in which labour relations take place, are so many
and so diverse, that the individual analysis of each industry seems inevitable. Hence, data at
the level of the firm must be used to better conclude on these issues.
Finally, a warning has emerged from the paper as a side exercise regarding the use of
household or establishment data. Both sources are not exchangeable and work should be
done previous to any analysis in order to be sure that we are measuring the appropriate
theoretical concepts.20
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Dynamics Temporal Stability
Employment IF FF Employment IF FF
Variable Coefficient Std.Error Coefficient Std.Error Variable Coefficient Std.Error Coefficient Std.Error
Constant 0,64116 0,26209 0,98576 0,21538 Constant 1,19610 0,22779 1,18490 0,21593
I31 -0,01372 0,02691 0,01478 0,02300 I31 0,04566 0,02300 0,06318 0,02258
I32 0,00489 0,01734 0,02558 0,01483 I32 0,04561 0,01550 0,04970 0,01492
I34 0,01353 0,01667 -0,00371 0,01424 I34 -0,02499 0,01458 -0,03489 0,01448
I35 -0,02275 0,02003 -0,02074 0,01821 I35 -0,03411 0,01840 -0,01433 0,01909
I36 0,00296 0,02575 -0,02668 0,02153 I36 -0,05033 0,02110 -0,06451 0,02075
qr1 0,01939 0,00903 0,01247 0,00788 qr1 0,00846 0,00749 -0,00058 0,00650
qr2 0,00530 0,00805 -0,00131 0,00635 qr2 0,00272 0,00622 0,00577 0,00608
qr3 -0,01468 0,00782 -0,02155 0,00600 qr3 -0,02015 0,00587 -0,01832 0,00589
PROD 0,20868 0,03646 0,15653 0,04022 PROD 0,12906 0,03994 0,03101 0,01846
PROD_1 -0,13275 0,03007 -0,10004 0,03047 PROD_1 -0,07651 0,03244
PROD_2 0,03002 0,02377 PROD93 -0,02715 0,01820
PROD_3 -0,06791 0,02399 PROD93_1 0,03166 0,02109
PROD_4 0,01771 0,02061
RW -0,02836 0,04731 -0,05856 0,01037 RW -0,05287 0,01758 -0,05295 0,01730




L_1 0,88251 0,05782 0,91816 0,01890 L_1 0,89524 0,02042 0,90071 0,01943
L_2 -0,01738 0,07571 L93_1 -0,00876 0,00460
L_3 0,10870 0,07565
L_4 -0,02567 0,05874 D93 -0,09611 0,08615 -0,18094 0,07012
\sigma =0,0396966 \sigma =0,0380211 \sigma = 0,0361166 \sigma = 0,036478
Non-production/ production ratio Non-roduction/ production ratio
IF FF IF FF
Variable Coefficient Std.Error Coefficient Std.Error Variable Coefficient Std.Error Coefficient Std.Error
Constant -0,23019 0,04649 -0,23560 0,03956 Constant -0,25709 0,04626 -0,25227 0,04022
I31 0,00593 0,01269 0,00082 0,01218 I31 0,00345 0,01244 0,00349 0,01201
I32 -0,09497 0,02477 -0,11804 0,02204 I32 -0,12685 0,02252 -0,12355 0,02211
I34 0,07515 0,01888 0,08111 0,01688 I34 0,08935 0,01865 0,08732 0,01697
I35 0,07431 0,02394 0,10946 0,02102 I35 0,12904 0,02292 0,12700 0,02204
I36 -0,04257 0,01591 -0,05136 0,01448 I36 -0,05310 0,01495 -0,05161 0,01430
qr1 0,02508 0,01349 0,00769 0,00996 qr1 0,00969 0,00995 0,00932 0,00981
qr2 -0,00522 0,01362 -0,01124 0,00973 qr2 -0,01167 0,00960 -0,01165 0,00956
qr3 0,01517 0,01304 0,00475 0,00954 qr3 0,00413 0,00941 0,00415 0,00937
RWSU -0,21051 0,05576 -0,03793 0,02687 RWSU -0,06740 0,03791 -0,06923 0,02882
RWSU_1 0,08819 0,06619 RWSU93 -0,00095 0,04731
RWSU_2 -0,03203 0,06579 LSU_1 0,74634 0,03501 0,74948 0,03451
RWSU_3 0,12732 0,06437 LSU93_1 -0,00558 0,01537
RWSU_4 0,05801 0,05502 D93 0,01938 0,03453 0,02450 0,00761




\sigma =0,0598478 \sigma =0,0595281 \sigma = 0,0587871 \sigma = 0,05852223
Real wage Real wage
IF FF IF FF
Variable Coefficient Std.Error Coefficient Std.Error Variable Coefficient Std.Error Coefficient Std.Error
Constant -0,17254 0,05445 -0,12125 0,04679 Constant 0,06152 0,08628 0,00685 0,07705
I31 0,01189 0,01128 0,01773 0,01082 I31 0,03766 0,01653 0,01715 0,01084
I32 0,00034 0,01006 0,00326 0,00965 I32 0,01686 0,01227 0,00360 0,00961
I34 -0,00056 0,01204 0,00721 0,01143 I34 0,03782 0,01826 0,01176 0,01147
I35 0,04046 0,01834 0,04876 0,01592 I35 0,09450 0,02223 0,06045 0,01685
I36 -0,00328 0,01403 0,00359 0,01298 I36 0,02175 0,01840 0,00267 0,01297
qr1 0,01644 0,01063 0,01622 0,00706 qr1 0,01958 0,00740 0,01468 0,00707
qr2 -0,02419 0,01034 -0,02817 0,00678 qr2 -0,03125 0,00699 -0,02832 0,00674
qr3 -0,01529 0,01052 -0,00510 0,00589 qr3 -0,00638 0,00578 -0,00604 0,00587
UN 0,02915 0,04863 0,02944 0,01732 UN 0,04734 0,01940 0,03458 0,01885




OPEN -0,00913 0,02531 -0,00711 0,00615 OPEN 0,02840 0,02190 -0,00657 0,00614
OPEN_1 0,03885 0,03434 OPEN93 -0,02680 0,01765
OPEN_2 -0,01859 0,03421
OPEN_3 -0,05581 0,03415 D93 0,02179 0,14094 0,01471 0,00993
OPEN_4 0,03124 0,02581
RAW 1,05180 0,04699 10496,0000
0
0,04401 RAW 1,06790 0,04758 1,03750 0,04448
RAW_1 -0,68170 0,09103 -0,82777 0,05418 RAW_1 -0,78308 0,06164 -0,81426 0,05432
RAW_2 -0,18733 0,09826 RAW93 -0,00150 0,03446
RAW_3 0,08098 0,09838 RAW93_1 -0,09312 0,05281
RAW_4 -0,03448 0,07498
RW_1 0,61784 0,05789 0,71602 0,04101 RW_1 0,62627 0,04743 0,69987 0,04142
RW_2 0,23195 0,06796 0,12412 0,03157 RW_2 0,11595 0,03349 0,11177 0,03229
RW_3 -0,06112 0,06888 RW93_1 0,08506 0,04324
RW_4 0,05738 0,05804 RW93_2 -0,00345 0,00302
\sigma =0,0363048 \sigma = 0,0366894 \sigma = 0,0358731 \sigma = 0,0364661




Variable Coefficient Std.Error Coefficient Std.Error
Constant 3,21970 0,51229 2,88860 0,47294
I31 -0,39871 1,21590 -0,48461 1,13790
I32 -1,38720 0,80023 -1,22790 0,78583
I34 -2,64740 0,86570 -2,52540 0,82209
I35 -1,25190 0,94540 -2,26380 0,96826
I36 -1,31910 0,95763 -1,43210 0,70573
qr1 0,00404 0,00617 0,00278 0,00639
qr2 0,00810 0,00590 0,00821 0,00587
qr3 -0,01601 0,00567 -0,01665 0,00565
D93 0,64400 0,26953 0,39242 0,25170






RW -0,16485 0,04345 -0,15851 0,04759
RW31 0,05940 0,07427 0,04077 0,06961
RW32 0,15304 0,06298 0,13663 0,06505
RW34 0,15516 0,06720 0,17171 0,06348
RW35 0,11793 0,05012 0,12218 0,05376
RW36 0,21597 0,08488 0,21804 0,07022
RW93 -0,11989 0,05108 -0,07353 0,04801
RW3193 -0,00548 0,00678 -0,00211 0,00663
RW3293 -0,01865 0,00694 -0,01655 0,00689
RW3493 -0,00142 0,00684 -0,00422 0,00662
RW3593 0,01195 0,00970 0,01236 0,00982
RW3693 -0,02286 0,00741 -0,01921 0,00688
L_1 0,73353 0,04623 0,77204 0,04082
L31_1 0,03922 0,10137 0,03952 0,09517
L32_1 0,06848 0,06420 0,06637 0,06002
L34_1 0,19405 0,07532 0,17278 0,07113
L35_1 0,09763 0,08397 0,16384 0,08618
L36_1 0,01453 0,07942 0,02614 0,05915
\sigma = 0,0345611 \sigma =0,035003925
Real Wage IF FF
Variable Coefficient Std.Error Coefficient Std.Error
Constant 0,75487 0,34911 0,17083 0,08960
I31 -0,43765 0,43418 0,14029 0,05404
I32 0,03593 0,52438 0,05495 0,03310
I34 -0,38932 0,41686 0,05120 0,03859
I35 -0,66457 0,37421 -0,04114 0,05518
I36 -0,65770 0,50223 -0,02630 0,02483
qr1 0,01228 0,00697 0,01365 0,00691
qr2 -0,02599 0,00665 -0,02701 0,00656
qr3 -0,01037 0,00568 -0,00719 0,00567
D93 -0,03694 0,03502 -0,01087 0,02770
UN 0,00642 0,03148 0,02855 0,02721
UN31 -0,15430 0,12183 -0,21320 0,09119
UN32 -0,17415 0,11182 -0,08789 0,05707
UN34 -0,00694 0,07122 -0,05609 0,06783
UN35 0,13684 0,06545 0,14849 0,05866
UN36 0,07325 0,09751 0,10094 0,06157
UN93 0,09652 0,08493 -0,01235 0,05686
UN9331 0,03596 0,08534 0,05732 0,05973
UN9332 0,02036 0,08723 0,02660 0,05717
UN9334 0,10238 0,08605 0,14187 0,05133
UN9335 0,00522 0,07456 0,10452 0,04279
UN9336 0,69498 0,36871 0,61777 0,25670






RAW 1,21350 0,07702 1,04090 0,04425























\sigma = 0.0336345 \sigma = 0.035156926
Non-production/ production ratio
IF FF
Variable Coefficient Std.Error Coefficient Std.Error
Constant -0,53897 0,12130 -0,52960 0,11642
I31 0,30880 0,17388 0,28601 0,14850
I32 -0,09619 0,19970 -0,09709 0,19093
I34 0,42536 0,14722 0,40795 0,13483
I35 0,47563 0,15950 0,46537 0,13995
I36 0,29660 0,16135 0,29732 0,15052
qr1 0,01364 0,01019 0,01319 0,00988
qr2 -0,01123 0,00982 -0,01085 0,00957
qr3 0,00189 0,00965 0,00248 0,00940
D93 0,03674 0,01113 0,03463 0,00849






LSU_1 0,48356 0,11205 0,48482 0,10650
LSU31_1 0,23305 0,14012 0,24506 0,12889
LSU32_1 0,06119 0,15296 0,09681 0,13424
LSU34_1 0,30166 0,13857 0,29471 0,13205
LSU35_1 0,28852 0,14889 0,30513 0,14194
LSU36_1 0,29700 0,13042 0,29451 0,12350
\sigma = 0,0599442 \sigma =0,0584916
loglik = 3635.5 loglik = 3590.1